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WHOSE NATURAL LAW?*
WILLIAM

J. KENEALY, S.J.**

P ROFESSOR GEORGE W. GOBLE of the Law Faculty

of the University
of Illinois has written a challenging and significant article, entitled
"NATURE, MAN AND LAW: THE TRUE NATURAL LAW," in
the American Bar Association Journal of May, 1955. (Vol. 41, No. 5,
p. 403). Professor Goble's article is refreshingly free from the acerbities
which too often detract from the substance of controversial articles pro
and con the natural law. The article manifests the kindness and humility
of sincere scholarship. It follows a standard of calm and dispassionate
controversy which might well assist both proponents and opponents of
the classical natural law, if not to resolve their differences, at least to
discover them. Such a mutual discovery, in the opinion of this reviewer,
would be a major contribution to the most ancient controversy of the law.
Professor Goble's article is significant because it illustrates the fact
that the status quaestionis of the old controversy is badly out of joint. It
brings into focus the fact that contemporary proponents and opponents of
the classical natural law frequently argue about "two different things."
The issue is not joined. Professor Goble sets up and rejects a concept
of natural law which would also be repudiated by every classicist from
Thomas Aquinas to Heinrich Rommen. By "classicists" I mean the
scholars and spokesmen of the traditional natural law philosophy as
expounded by the medieval scholastics and the modern neo-scholastics.
The concept rejected by Professor Goble differs essentially from the
classical concept in two fundamental and all-pervasive aspects: the very
meaning of the natural law, and its epistemological basis. Obviously the
issue cannot be joined and the merits cannot be argued on the basis of
such fundamental misunderstanding.
*Reprinted

from I CATHOLIC LAWYER 259 (October, 1955).

** A.B.; A.M.; Ph.D.; S.T.L.; LL.B. Member of the Bar of the District of Colum-

bia and of the State of Massachusetts. Admitted to practice in the Supreme Court
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In discussing the meaning of the classical
or traditional concept of natural law, I
trust that I will be forgiven for quoting an
official statement of the Law School of
which I am dean. I do so for two reasons:
first, I wrote it some years ago in an attempt to set out a concise statement of the
classical concept; and secondly, it has appeared annually for some years in the official Bulletin of a Law School dedicated to
the traditional natural law philosophy. To
the best of my knowledge, it has not been
the target of a single shaft of disagreement
from the ready quivers of traditional natural law philosophers. The statement, with
italics as they appear in the original text,
is as follows:
"The purpose of the Boston College
Law School is to prepare young men and
women of intelligence, industry and character, for careers of public service in the
administration of justice; to equip them
for positions of leadership in advancing
the ideals of justice in our democratic society. With this two-fold objective, students
are given a rigorous training in the principles and rules, the standards and techniques of the law, not as positivistic ends
in themselves, but as rational means, capable of constant improvement, to the attainment of objective justice in civil society.
"For the Boston College Law School is
dedicated to the philosophy that there is in
fact an objective moral order, to which
human beings and civil societies are bound
in conscience to conform, and upon which
the peace and happiness of personal, national and international life depend. The
mandatory aspect of the objective moral
order is called by philosophers the natural
law. In virtue of the natural law, funda-

mentally equal human beings are endowed
with certain natural rights and obligations
to enable them to attain, in human dignity,
the divine destiny decreed for them by their
Creator. These natural rights and obligations are inalienable precisely because they
are God-given. They are antecedent, both
in logic and in nature, to the formation of
civil societies. They are not granted by the
beneficence of the state; wherefore the
tyranny of a state cannot destroy them.
Rather it is the high moral responsibility
of civil society, through the instrumentality
of its civil laws, to acknowledge their existence and to protect their exercise, to foster
and facilitate their enjoyment by the wise
and scientific implementation of the natural
law with a practical and consonant code
of civil rights and obligations.
"The construction and maintenance of a
corpus juris adequately implementing the
natural law is a monumental and perpetual
task demanding the constant devotion of
the best brains and the most mature
scholarship of the legal profession. For the
fundamental principles of the natural law,
universal and immutable as the human
nature from which they derive, require
rational application to the constantly
changing political, economic and social
conditions of civil society. The application
of the natural law postulates change as
the circumstances of human, existence
change. It repudiates a naive and smug
complacency in the status quo. It demands
a reasoned acceptance of the good, and a
rejection of the bad, in all that is new.
It commands a critical search for the better. It requires an exhaustive scrutiny of
all the available data of history, politics,
economics, sociology, psychology, philos-
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ophy, and every other pertinent font of
human knowledge. Of primary importance,
it insists that the search for a better corpus
juris be made in the light of the origin, nature, dignity and destiny of man; and in the
knowledge of the origin, nature, purpose
and limitations of the state.
"This is the traditional American philosophy of law, the philosophy upon which
this nation was founded and to which this
nation, by its most solemn covenants and
usages, is dedicated. It is opposed today,
even by some within the legal profession,
by the philosophies of positivism, pragmatism, realism and utilitarianism-all of
which have an ideological common denominator in subjectivism-and none of
which can offer an intellectually adequate
reply to the destructive philosophy of
totalitarianism." Cf. Boston College Bulletin, Vol. XXVII, No. 2, April, 1955.
I believe that this capsule description of
natural law philosophy is in complete harmony, not only with the classical concept
of Maritain, Gilson, Rommen and the
modern neo-scholastics, but also with that
of Aquinas, Suarez, Vittoria and the
medieval scholastics. Hundreds of professors, teaching the classical concept in universities today, would undoubtedly write
a better description; but I am confident
that none would dispute the substance of
the statement quoted. If this is so, if the
statement fairly represents the meaning of
the classical natural law concept, with
particular reference to its notion of immutability and universality, its distinction
between ends and means, its requirement
of change and improvement, and its search
for the good and the better, then I find it
difficult to escape the conclusion that Pro-
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fessor Goble has not come to grips with
that concept. I think that he is chastising
the wrong horse.
Professor Goble seems to contemplate
the classical concept as meaning a completely closed system of principles and
rules, immutable and universal, incapable
of change and improvement, and therefore
a hindrance to the pursuit of truth and an
obstacle to the development of a better
system of justice. He states:
Holmes, unlike the natural law man, did

not believe that because he firmly held certain views, they were necessarily universal
or infallible truths, or that the acceptance of
them by others was essential to the preservation of civilization or the republic .... The

classical natural law on the other hand, by
definition, must forever remain unchanged.

While experience has required its devotees
to recede from this position from time to
time, by hypothesis the system is immutable.
No amount of experience or new light may

be used as the basis for altering it or revising it. It seems to me therefore, that the
Holmes' view makes possible the continuous
advance of the standards of human conduct,
whereas the natural law view, having in
theory already attained perfection, retards

it. (P. 474, emphasis supplied.)
I trust that the above quotations do not
distort Professor Goble's context. That context misses the meaning of the classical
natural law of the scholastic tradition. In
fairness to Professor Goble, his context has
considerable relevance to the "natural law"
theories of Pufendorf, Thomasius, Hobbes,
Spinoza and their followers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This was
the era of the various "state of nature"
theories which fascinated the autonomous
rationalism of the times. The "state of na-
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ture" theories inspired an orgy of abstract
reasoning which gave birth to deductively
constructed systems purporting to regulate
and to crystallize all legal institutions down
to incredible details: prescribing the rules
affecting contracts, debts, the acquisition
and use of property, inheritance, the family,
constitutional and international law-and
even procedural laws in the alleged "states
of nature." Such theories were frequently
utilized for rather practical purposes:
sometimes to strengthen the contemporary
political, economic and social status quo
by dignifying it with the blessing of "natural law"; sometimes to undermine the
prevailing status quo by damning it with
the condemnation of "natural law." But
all such "state of nature" theories, with
their closed and crystallized legal systems,
were and are alien and hostile to the classical concept of natural law. Their authors
are the express adversaries of the scholastic
system. I need not point out that the theological phrase status purae naturae has
only a verbal similarity to the philosophical "states of nature" of rationalism.
It is quite true, of course, that the classical natural law postulates some fundamental principles, which are considered immediately self-evident principles of the
practical reason, as certain, universal and
immutable. But this is a far cry from a
closed legal system. The fundamental principles of the natural law are generally divided into a primary principle and its
immediate specifications, called secondary
principles. The primary principle is usually
phrased in such terms as "What is good is
to be done, and what is evil is to be
avoided," a principle which includes "What
is just is to be done, and what is unjust is

to be avoided." As immediate specifications of the primary principle, the secondary principles find familiar expression
in the (still general) terms of the Decalogue. The secondary principles share the
certainty, universality and immutability of
the primary principle. But when we advance from these fundamental principles,
we enter the field of derivative principles
and standards and applications of the natural law to concrete problems.
The derivatives do not share equally,
some do not share at all in the certainty,
universality and immutability of the fundamental principles. They do not bask in the
sunshine of immediate self-evidence. They
must be laboriously cultivated in the much
dimmer light, sometimes in the darker twilight of mediate evidence. In the field of
derivatives there is certainty, probability
and mere possibility; there is growth,
change and improvement. Incidentally,
even the truths called "self-evident" in the
Declaration of Independence are not selfevident in the philosophical sense. They
are derivative principles of natural law.
They must be demonstrated by argument.
It is only the fundamental principles of
the natural law which are held to be selfevident, and consequently certain, universal and immutable. From this position
devotees of classical natural law have not
receded "from time to time." It is a fair
question to ask: what fundamental principle, what principle held to be certain, universal and immutable has been relinquished at any time by devotees of the
classical natural law?
That natural law does not mean a closed
legal system, is evident from the fact that
the fundamental principles do not tell us
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automatically in concrete applications what
is good or evil, just or unjust, wise or unwise; what is idolatry, murder, theft, adultery, perjury or calumny. It is evident from
the fact that the natural law envisions an
enormous number of actions which are
indifferent in themselves, and which receive their morality (and suitable legality)
from the relative elements of time, place
and circumstance, and from the subjective
elements of intention and motive. It is evident from the fact that the natural law
concept requires the construction, maintenance and improvement of a corpus juris
to meet the needs of a constantly changing
human society; and that it demands that
this perpetual task be performed by the
scholarly and practical use of the expanding data of human knowledge and experience. This is utterly incompatible with Professor Goble's idea of the "attained perfection" of the classical natural law concept.
The possession of a compass does not
make the navigator's job unnecessary.
Professor Goble objects to the traditional natural law concept because he believes it has been used to further objectionable causes and to obstruct desirable
social and economic reforms. He states:
Exponents of classical natural law are
usually able to find or create natural law
principles which support what they want to
believe ....
Before the Civil War both proslavery and anti-slavery advocates invoked
natural law as the basis for their views....
During the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries the opposition to legislation prohibiting child labor, reducing working hours
for women, and improving working condi-

tions in hazardous industries, was based
partly upon the principle that by natural
law, freedom of contract could not be interfered with legislation. (P. 473.)

CATHOLIC

LAWYER,

AUTUMN

1971

The first quoted sentence pinpoints an
unfortunate psychological weakness which
afflicts all men when they are blinded by
emotions, prejudices and the smoke of selfish interests. Natural law exponents can
claim no immunity from the weakness
which, I dare say, sometimes leads positivists, pragmatists, realists and utilitarians
"to find or create" respective principles
"which support what they want to believe." All of us need to overcome this
weakness by an intensification of scholarly
criticism and dispassionate controversy.
The chief examples cited by Professor
Goble are, to say the least, weak indictments of the classical natural law. The
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
spanned the era of laissez-faire rugged individualism, which stemmed from the philosophies of Rousseau, Kant, Austin and
the Manchester School of Economics. It
is true that the Supreme Court of the era
utilized the terminology of "natural law"
to deify an abstract concept of liberty of
contract for the protection of vested property interests to the detriment of human
rights. But the philosophers mentioned
above, and the proponents of laissez-faire
rugged individualism are again the express
adversaries of the classical natural law
philosophy. Again, it is fair to ask what
representative natural law philosopher or
spokesman held the principle that "by natural law, freedom of contract could not be
interfered with by legislation"? A philosophy is one thing, its terminology is another;
but its terminology in the mouths of its
express adversaries is a great source of confusion, misunderstanding and embarrassment. Economic Liberalism itself recognized the classical natural law philosophy
as its prime adversary.

WHOSE NATURAL

LAW?

Professor Goble's criticism of classical
natural law, on the basis of its alleged "attained perfection" and immutability, seems
analogous to the criticism of those who
reject natural law philosophy because it defends absolute natural rights. Natural law
does indeed imply the existence of some
human rights which are absolute and inalienable, such as the right to life, worship,
marriage, property, labor, speech, locomotion, assembly, reputation, etc. These are
absolute in the sense that they derive from
human nature; they are not mere hand-outs
from the state; the state is bound to protect
them and cannot destroy them even though,
by physical force, the state has sometimes
prevented their exercise. They are not absolute in the sense that they are unlimited
in scope. It is a commonplace in classical
natural law philosophy that human rights,
even the most fundamental mentioned
above, are limited. They are limited in the
sense that they are subject to specification,
qualification, expansion and contraction,
and even forfeiture of exercise, as the equal
rights of others and the demands of the
common good from circumstance to circumstance, and from time to time, reasonably indicate. Human rights are absolute only in the sense of the minimal
requirements of a just and ordered liberty.
But this is not the stuff of a closed system
of immutably "attained perfection." This is
the stuff which requires the constant study,
scholarship, experience and experimentation implied in the quotation I have made
from the Boston College Law School Bulletin. For the above reasons I believe Professor Goble has misunderstood the meaning of the classical natural law philosophy.

fessor Goble's misunderstanding of the
epistemological basis of natural law. This
basis answers to the question of why natural law men hold what they hold. Professor Goble says:

Of equal significance, I believe, is Pro-

I have supplied the italics in the above

Since reason is fallible, the principal
problem posed by this view of natural law
[quoted, by the way, from Dean Pound] is
how or by whose reasoning is this infallible
law to be determined. When two or more
men or groups of men of equal sincerity
believe themselves to be endowed by the
Creator with the power to ascertain and
enunciate it, and they are in disagreement,
by what criterion is the choice to be made
between them? . . . History furnishes so

many examples of fighting faiths later rejected as unconscionable that it is difficult
for one to believe that sincerity or certitude
is a reliable test of truth. (P. 407. Emphasis
supplied.)
Witness the comparatively recent condemnation of millions of innocent people to
death in gas chambers, to imprisonment in
slave labor camps and to banishment in the
salt mines because of the certitude of their
condemners as to their own racial superiority or the infallibility of their political systems. .

.

. Before the Civil War both

pro-slavery and anti-slavery advocates invoked natural law as the basis for their
views. (P. 473.)
Mr. Justice Holmes has been one of the
great critics of the classical natural law
theory. He said, "The jurists who believe in
natural law seem to me to be in that naive
state of mind, that accepts what has been
familiar, and accepted by them and their
neighbors, as something that must be accepted by all men everywhere." Holmes believed that "Certitude is not the test of

certainty," and that "we have been cocksure of many things that were not so."
(PP. 473-474. Emphasis supplied.)
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quotations. From these quotations and their
context, and I trust they do not distort the
context, I infer that Professor Goble believes that the epistemological basis of natural law philosophy is: the criterion of
truth is subjective certitude or sincerity of
subjective conviction. This is simply not
true. It is diametrically opposed to the epistemology of classical natural law. It is fair
to ask for the name of one responsible
natural law spokesman who makes subjective conviction the criterion of truth. On the
contrary, natural law philosophers unanimously set up objective evidence as the
criterion of truth. The philosophers of various theories of subjectivism, Descartes,
Spinoza, Leibnitz, Berkeley, Hume, and
their followers are again the express epistemological adversaries of classical natural
law.
The natural law is founded upon the
existence of an objective moral order and
the knowability of objective truth. Quite
consistently, and necessarily, it makes objective evidence the criterion of that truth.
To argue for or against natural law, or any
one of its principles, or any application of
its principles, on the basis of mere subjective certitude or sincerity of conviction,
would be as irrelevant and immaterial as
any similar argument in any intellectual
field-philosophical, scientific or legal.
Subjectivism is sheer intellectual defeatism.
According to Professor Goble "the principal problem posed" by the natural law,
when "two or more men or groups of men
of equal sincerity" are in disagreement, is
this: "by what criterion is the choice to be
made between them?" The natural law philosopher answers: objective evidence. And
to the question as to who shall make the
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choice, the answer is: whoever undertakes
to evaluate the objective evidence. This is
the epistemological basis for the civil law
rules of evidence. This is the standard underlying our legal trials. This is the standard applied by our supreme courts in the
difficult due process cases, which touch
natural law principles most closely. To
abandon objective evidence for a subjective
standard would be to open the flood-gates
of arbitrariness and capriciousness. Subjectivism is simply incompatible with natural
law philosophy.
In criticising natural law, Professor
Goble cites Holmes to the effect that
"Certitude is not the test of certainty" and
that "we have been cock-sure of many
things that were not so." With this observation of Holmes, I agree. My agreement
rests upon the objective evidence of my
own personal errors and the objective evidence of the history of human thought.
Furthermore, my agreement extends to the
epistemological principle which seems to
be implicit in the words of Holmes:
namely, that there is a rational basis for
making a distinction between "certitude"
and "certainty"; that there is an intellectual
difference between error and truth; and that
at least some cock-sure errors of the past
have been overhauled by the relentless pursuit of objective truth. To me this means
that there are in fact some objective truths
known with certainty on the basis of objective evidence. And if there are some so
known, what limits shall we put to the
critical and dispassionate pursuit of others?
But this is the epistemology of classical
natural law.
Professor Goble places great emphasis
upon errors of the past, and upon the con-
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tradictions and disagreements of the past
and present-particularly those concerning
political, economic, social and legal problems. As an argument specifically against
natural law, this proves altogether too
much. Its probative value, if any, militates
against any and all philosophies. Positivists,
pragmatists, realists and utilitarians differ
considerably as to what in the concrete is
positivistic, pragmatic, realistic and useful.
But such differences surely do not constitute the intellectual basis for rejecting the
philosophies of positivism, pragmatism,
realism or utilitarianism. Natural law philosophers agree on the fundamental principles of the natural law; they differ on its
derivative principles and standards; and
there is wide divergence of opinion as to
the concrete applications of its derivative
principles and standards to the constantly
changing political, economic, social and
legal conditions of human society. But what
do such differences of opinion prove?
Surely not the invalidity of the fundamental
philosophy. Such differences demonstrate
that the area of opinion is larger than the
area of certainty. Such differences prove
the finiteness of the human mind and the
enormous complexity of the human problems which we must constantly strive to
solve as best we can. Our differences
should indeed humble us and make us
more tolerant of the opinions of others;
but they should not defeat us or discourage
the relentless pursuit of objective truth.
Because they do not prove the incapacity
of the human mind to know with certainty
(i.e., without prudent fear of error) some
objective truths on the basis of objective
evidence. As a matter of fact, "when two
or more men or groups of men of equal
sincerity" differ, they may both be wrong;

but the significant thing is that their very
differing is predicated upon the assumption
that there is some objective truth to differ
about, and that the pursuit of objective
truth is worth-while. Error is simply unintelligible without the existence of objective truth attainable by human reason.
It is obvious, I trust, that this commentary on Professor Goble's article is in no
sense an attempt to prove the validity of
natural law or the soundness of its epistemology. It is simply an attempt to show
that Professor Goble has misunderstood the
meaning and the epistemology of the classical natural law philosophy. It is my personal opinion that there are three factors
which have induced such a misunderstanding on the part of Professor Goble and
many others in the legal profession. They
are: first, the misuse of natural law terminology, in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, in support of laissezfaire rugged individualism; second, the almost complete unfamiliarity of most members of the profession with the writings of
the great natural law philosophers, and a
consequent reliance upon secondary (and
sometimes unscholarly) sources of information; and third, an unfortunate propensity, on the part of some natural law
enthusiasts, to claim too much for their
philosophy.
Concerning the first factor: many United
States Supreme Court opinions of the last
century, indicated by Professor Goble,
which exalted property and contractual
rights to the detriment of other basic human
rights and the genuine needs of the common good, are excellent examples. Regarding the second: the writings of Holmes and
the article by Professor Goble are, I be-

17
lieve, clear instances. As to the third: I
have reference to the naive mentality
which would say "all we have to do to
solve our problems is to apply the natural
law." This mentality has its counterpart,
of course, in that which would say "all we
have to do to solve our problems is to be
realistic" or "pragmatic." It is quite like
the simplicist attitude of the naive citizen
who would say "all we have to do to solve
our problems is to apply the Constitution."
The fact is that the classical natural law
philosophy teaches, as one of its prime
tenets, that the natural law and its fundamental principles are inadequate to solve
the complex problems of human society.
The natural law demands implementation
by civil law; and such implementation fre-
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quently involves, not merely research and
argumentation, certitude and probability,
but also trial and error experimentation.
But this is not the natural law dismissed
by Professor Goble.
Wherefore I have entitled this commentary "WHOSE NATURAL LAW?" Whose
natural law does Professor Goble dismiss?
Not mine. Not that of the Boston College
Law School. Not that of the medieval scholastics. Not that of the modern neo-scholastics. Not that of the classical tradition.
Whose? I confess that I look forward to the
opportunity to sit down informally with
Professor Goble some day to discuss, and
if possible to clarify, for our mutual satisfaction, the status quaestionis of the oldest
controversy of the law.

